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Rehabilitation of Drug-Dependent Persons
Paul A. Lichtman*
N TODAY'S FAST-PACED SOCIETY, we are the witnesses of a very unusual
phenomenon. People are consuming drugs at a rate never before
realized.' Stimulant drugs are being taken to keep the individual
going during the day.2 Depressant drugs are being ingested to help
the individual bury his anxieties. 3 Drugs have been developed for
practically every form of illness, whether organic or psychological.'
The majority of people who do use the various kinds of legend 5
drugs do so legally, under a physician's 6 supervision. There is a
growing minority, however, who abuse drugs to the extent that these
individuals become what is currently known as drug-dependent. 7
This situation presents a clear and existing danger.
The problem of drug abuse is not confined to slum or ghetto
communities, but is also a part of suburbia and more well-to-do
societies.8
The federal government was aware of the drug problem as far
back as 1909, when Congress deliberated on the disturbing increase
of opium traffic in the United States. Congress subsequently passed
the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act.9 This act and others to
follow did little to curb the increase of illicit drugs into America.
Federal laws which have dealt with the problem of drug abuse have
very rarely included programs of education and rehabilitation for
those who are already drug-dependent. These exceptions have also
tried to answer such questions as: What about the individual who is
drug-dependent but has not committed a crime, and should the state
or Congress enact laws for the benefit of the drug-dependent per-
son's welfare?
*B.S., Pharm., Long Island University; Third-year student at Cleveland State University
College of Law; Practicing Community Pharmacist.
The author wishes to acknowledge the help and cooperation of Mr. Igor I. Sikorsky,
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preparation of this article.
I G. Leinwand, The Problem and the Challenge, DRUGS 13 (1970) ; G. Griffenhagen,
Respect Medicines, NS10 J. AM. PHARM. Ass'WN. 447 (1970).
2 G. Leinwand, Supra note 1 at 14.
3 Id. at 15.
4 Id at 16.
5 Certain drugs require the supervision of a medical practitioner and must bear the
legend CAUTON: Federal law prohibits dispensing without a prescription. 21 U.S.C.A.
333, 352, 353, 355 (1964). The above requirement is commonly referred to as the
Durham-Humphrey Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C.A. 301 (1938).
6 The term physician includes any health practitioner who is licensed by state law
to prescribe drugs.
7 THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS Aqn THERAPY 1153 (11th ed. 1966).
8 J. Finlator, The Drug Syndrome in the Affluent Society, 13 J, FORENSIC SCI. 293, 296
(1968).
9 35 Stat. 614, ch. 100 (1909). For an excellent review of drug legislation, see also C.
Hoff, Drug Abuse, 51 MIL. L. REv. 161-180 (1971).
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Drug Abuse and Society
For the last twenty years many advocates of strict control of
drugs and the treatment of its victims, have attempted to make the
plight of the drug-dependent person known to society. One pro-
ponent for drug treatment and rehabilitation has stated:
Addiction is not only a disease, it is a dangerous disease
for which there is no specific cure presently known to the
civilized world. It is more dangerous than cancer. Cancer is
not infectious; drug addiction is. Addiction is epidemic in
metropolitan areas-it is the new bubonic plague and spreads
on contact.' 0
Most medical authorities agree that there should be more research in
the field of rehabilitation and in the prevention of relapses. 1 Lead-
ing medical experts suggest, with few exceptions, that withdrawal
is usually successful only in a drug-free environment. 12 There are
also those in the medical profession who believe that a better way
to treat addicts is the English System of treatment.13 Dr. Laurence
Kolb, former medical director of the United States Public Health
Hospital, Lexington, Kentucky, has stated before a Senate hearing
on the rehabilitation of drug addicts that:
Europeans regulate narcotics, as we do, but they are not
alarmed by addiction, as we so obviously are. They have
never lost sight of the fact that, as a great English physician
wrote in the 19th Century, "Opium soothes, alcohol maddens."
An English doctor is free to prescribe narcotic drugs,
exercising his professional discretion, when it is found, after
prolonged attempts at cure of addiction, that the opiate cannot
safely be discontinued or when it is demonstrated that the
patient can lead a useful, normal life when a certain minimum
dose is given regularly, but is incapacitated when the drug
is entirely stopped.14
It should be noted, however, that the English experiment had to be
recently revised. This revision was needed due to the lack of con-
trols in dispensing of narcotics by British physicians, causing a new
influx of young addicts.15 Presently only a few specialists are certified
to dispense narcotics.16
Another approach to the treatment and rehabilitation of drug-
dependent patients is incarceration in a drug-free environment such
as a hospital or similar facility. 7 The results, however, are far from
'0 M. McDonald, A Judge Looks at Drug Addiction, TRIAL 16 (May/June 1971).
11 UNITED STATES DISPENSATORY AND PHYSICIAN'S PHARMACOLOGY 452 (26th ed. 1967).
12 L. GOODMAN AND A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 301
(4th ed. 1970).
13 Hearings on S. Res. 62 and S. Res 173 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 164- (1956).
14 Id.
15 T. Bewley, and 0. Ben-Arie, Morbidity and Mortuality from Heroin Dependence,
BR. MED. J. 725 at 727-730 (1968).
16 Id.
17 L. GOODMAN AND A. GILMAN, supra note 13, at 305.
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satisfactory. Subsequent evaluations of data show that between 90%
of patients completing only six months of the program and 46% of
patients completing five years of the program become readdicted.18
Testifying before a House of Representatives Committee on
Crime, the Hon. Jack H. Backman, member of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives, gave the following account against com-
pulsory incarceration:
As you, yourselves, the Congress, have decided, the com-
pulsory incarceration of individuals because of drugs does not
work. And as you know, you are closing down your inde-
pendent institutions in Fort Worth and Lexington, Kentucky
with the closing statement that this follows twenty or twenty-
five years of failure.
Compulsory treatment of a drug-dependent person can't
work. For this reason our (Massachusetts Drug Commission)
commission has recommended no compulsory treatment; only
voluntary treatment of a drug-dependent person as an alter-
nate to criminal prosecution. Not after he gets convicted, but
before he goes to trial.19
From the above statement and additional testimony from subsequent
investigations, it would seem that the most favorable program for
the treatment of drug-dependent persons is the concept of civil com-
mitment as opposed to criminal commitment.
The first jurisdiction to implement civil commitment was the
District of Columbia. 20 Unfortunately, the patients committed under
the District of Columbia statute were sent to the United States
Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky. It is unfor-
tunate because the relapse rate at this facility has been very high.21
Civil commitment programs are now found in other states, 22 but
information regarding their success remains to be shown.
We must not regard civil commitment as a cure-all because as
a well-known authority on narcotic addiction once said:
Those who hope for basic reform are sometimes inclined
to regard the civil commitment bandwagon as the opening
wedge of a movement toward more important changes. This
view may be right. It may, on the other hand, have the oppo-
site effect because it is often viewed as a non-punitive, quasi-
medical program. If it fails or accomplishes little, ideas like
that of locking addicts up in concentration camps may gain
ground.2 3
18 Id. See also H. Duvall, B. Locke, and L. Brill, Follow up Study of Narcotic Drug
A4ddicts Five Years after Hospitalization, Pun. HEALTH REP., Wash. 78, 185-193 (1963).
19 Hearings on H. Res. 17 Before the House Select Comm. on Crime, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 212 (Sept. 1969).
20 Public Law 76-149, 67 Stat. 77 (1953), Amending Public Law 84-764, 70 Stat. 609,
42 U. S. C. A. 260a (1956).
21 L. GOODMAN and A. GILMAN, supra note 13, at 305.
22 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1971); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE § 11391 (West 1968).
23 A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW,,294 (1965).
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Another form of treatment program which has gained much at-
tention in recent years is the experimental program known as Syna-
non. Synanon is made up of former addicts who participate in the
rehabilitation of current addicts. The addict must meet certain rigid
admission requirements, most important of which is the addict's will-
ingness to accept his present condition and to seriously want to be
helped.24 Above all, the addict must not want to use Synanon as an
excuse to escape from society.25
A program similar to Synanon under government supervision is
Daytop Village (formerly Daytop Lodge).26 Daytop Village operates
under a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health and is
operated by the Probation Department of the Supreme Court of the
City of New York. As in Synanon, the addict who wishes to join
Daytop must exhibit a strong desire to undergo rehabilitation.2 7
Since Synanon and Daytop Village are fairly recent attempts
only scattered reports are available. However, the possibility of
finally returning the addict as a useful member of society looks
very favorable.28 Rehabilitation programs should be enacted with
the cooperation of private groups like Synanon and with local and
state governments.
The State's Right to Punish, Enforce and Control.
Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the Court in Keller v. United
States29 stated:
... that fact must not close the eye to the question whether the
power to punish therefore is delegated to Congress or is reserved
to the State.30
The above case dealt with the violation of a United States statute3 '
dealing with prostitution. The above question brought before the
Court was the right to punish. Does Congress or the state have this
right? The Keller Court answered this question by stating:
Jurisdiction over such an offense comes within the ac-
cepted definition of police power. Speaking generally, that
power is reserved to the States, for there is in the Constitution
no grant thereof to Congress.32
24 Id at 296.
2" W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 154 (2nd ed. 1967).
26 Shelly and Bassin, Daylop Lodge-A New Treatment Approach for Drug Addicts,
11 CORRECTIVE PSYCHIATRY 186 (July 1965).
27 W. ELDRIDGE, supra note 26 at 156.
25 D. CASRIEL and G. AMEN, DAYTOP, THREE ADDICTS AND THEIR CURE XV-XVi (1971) (A
detailed analysis of the Daytop concept is found at pp 136-150).
29 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
20 Id. at 144.
31 34 Stat. at L. 898, 899 ch. 1134 (1907).
32 Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, at 144 (1909).
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The Keller Court also relied on the leading case of Patterson v. Ken-
tucky 33 where the court said:
The power to establish the ordinary regulations of
police has been left with the individual states, and cannot
be assumed by the national government. (Cooley, Const. Lim.
574)34
The case of Watson v. Maryland35 provides another illustration as
to the use of a state's police power. This case involved a Maryland
statute requiring all persons who wished to practice medicine to
register in accordance with statutory provisions. In Mr. Justice Day's
opinion, he very aptly stated that:
It is too well settled to require discussion at this day that
the police power of the States extends to the regulation of
certain trades and callings, particularly those which closely
concern the public health.3 6
The above case was followed in Polhemus v. American Medical
Associaton,37 another leading case dealing with a state's statutory
regulation of the practice of medicine. Circuit Judge Huxman stated
in his opinion that:
It is recognized without exception that the police power
of a state extends to the right to regulate trades and callings
concerning public health.38
From the above decisions and others,39 the right of a state to regulate
individuals, who are members of certain trades and professions, es-
pecially in the area of public health, has been upheld by the courts.
One of the few avenues available to states in the area of rehab-
ilitation of drug-dependent persons is the utilization of their police
power.
There have been several states which have enacted laws to pro-
vide for rehabilitation.40 Connecticut has recently revised its drug
83 97 U.S. 501, 503 (1878).
84 Id.
35 218 U.S. 173 (1909).
30 Watson v. Maryland 218 U.S. at 176.
37 145 F. 2d 357 (10th Cir. 1944).
38 Polemus v. American Medical Ass'n, 145 F. 2d 357, at 359 (10th Cir. 1944).
39 American Consumer Industries v. City of New York, 28 App. Div. 2d 38, 281 N. Y. S.
2d 467 (1967).
40 Aaiz. REV. STAr. ANN. § 36-141 (1968); ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN., 1971 REPLACEMENT
§§ 59-408 el seq. (1971); CAL. HLTH. AND SAFETY CODE §§ 11390-11396 (1968);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-19, 146, §§ 17-155 a, b, d, 176, 183, 190, 193, 199, 201,
209, § 18-65, §§ 19-48a, 443-504, §§ 20-166, 180 (1967) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 397.011
et seq. (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. 23 §§ 3501 et seg. (1957) ; BURNs' IND. STAT. ANN.
22-1201 et seg. (1957); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 224A.1 et seq. (1971); LA. REV. STAT.
40 § 1051 et seg. (1968) ; MASS ANN. LAWS 94 § 213 A (1967), 123 § 38 el seg. (1971);
MICH. COMPILED LAWS §§ 330.301 el seq. (1967); ANN. Mo. STAT. §§ 195.500 et seq.
(1971); REV. STAT. OF NsB. § 71-2017 (1971); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B
(1969); N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 200-214- (McKinney 1971); PAGE'S OHIO
REV. CODE §§ 3719.51, 3719.61 (1970) (These Ohio statutes do not provide definite
facilities or programs for the treatment of drug dependent persons who have not
committed crimes. And complete discretion is left to% the courts to determine whether
(Continued on next page)
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abuse statutes to encompass not only narcotics addicts but all drug-
dependent persons.41 Part III of the Connecticut statute, which deals
with the treatment of drug-dependent individuals, states that drug-
dependence is not a criminal but a medical problem.42 Authority to
administer the statute is placed with the Commissioner of Mental
Health. 48 When a person is found to be drug-dependent, he does
not face a jail or a prison term but is committed to a state approved
health facility.44 That statute declared that drug abuse was in fact
a medical problem,45 but another section required that all medical
practitioners report the names of drug dependent patients.46
The question of constitutionality regarding the above patient
disclosure statute was recently decided in Felber v. Foote.4 7 The court
in Felber held that §19-48a of the Connecticut statute did not violate
any of the rights inherent in the physician-patient relationship. 48
The court also implied that the statute was a reasonable exercise of
Connecticut's police power.49 The Felber court also used the Connec-
ticut statute50 requiring physicians to report patients who suffer from
communicable diseases as an analogy. 51 In each situation the court
felt that the duty to report such information was a reasonable re-
quirement and in the best interests of the public. It must be pointed
out, however, that the above court action was brought before the
psychiatrist had actually treated the patient. Had the disclosure been
made after such treatment, the court may have reached a different
result. Then the question of physician-patient privilege may have
played a more important role. The question remains to be decided
if, and when, the situation actually occurs. The Felber court upheld
(Continued from preceding page)
convicted persons are eligible for medical treatment if proper petition is made. This
Ohio statute was recently discussed in State v. Stewart, 58 Ohio Op. 2d 188, 279
N. E. 2d 894- (Ct. Com. Pleas, Hamilton County, Crim. Div., Dec. 20, 1971). judge
Kraft ruled that a drug dependent person convicted of a crime must petition the
court during the same term to have his sentence waived for treatment of drug
dependence. The defendant's petition was not timely and was denied; OKLA. STATE
ANN. 43 A §§ 651 et seq. (1971); GENERAL LAWS OF R. I., 1968 REENAcTMENT, §§
21-28.2 et seq. (1970); CODE OF LAws OF S. C. §§ 32-995 et seq. (1968) ; S. D. Comd-
PILED LAWS OF 1967 § 27-8-1.1 (1970) ; TENN. ConE ANN. § 52-1432 (4-) (1971)
WEST'S WIS. STAT. ANN. 8§ 161.60-161.65 (1970).
41 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-19, 146, §§ 17-155a, b, d, 176, 183, 190, 198, 199, 201,
209, § 18-65, §§ 19-48a, 443-504, §§ 20-166, 180 (1967).
42 Id. at § 19-487.
43 Id. (The Mental Health Commissioner's authority is subject to the regulatory activity
of the Comms. of Health and Consumer Protection, the courts, the State Prosecuting
Attorney, and police authorities in dealing with illicit activity).
44 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-491-499 (1967).
45 Id. at § 19-487.
46 Id. at § 19-48a.
17 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970). Author's note: This case and some of the subsequent
cases are courts of first impression. For whatever reasons these cases have not been
appealed.
48 Id. at 87.
49 Id. at 89.
50 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-89 (1967).
51 Felber v. Foote 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970).
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the right of a state to regulate a profession when the information to
be gathered is for the public welfare.52
Treatment and Rehabilitation
The desire for a state or municipality to collect information re-
garding drug-dependent patients is mainly for the purpose of the
rehabilitation of its residents. It is not an invasion of privacy of the
state's health professions and/or private citizens.
The drug problem is not, however, confined within a state's
borders, but is national in scope. Recently, Congress also has seen fit
to exercise its police power for the public welfare. An example of
the exercise of the police power of Congress is the Narcotic Addict
Rehabilitation Act (NARA).5 3 It was the purpose of Congress that
there should be a way for those persons, who are addicted to narcotic
drugs, to receive treatment and hopefully be restored to health.5 4
This type of medical treatment is not only available to those charged
with or convicted of violating federal laws,5  but is also available to
those persons not charged with any crime.56
The constitutionality of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act
was raised in Ortega v. Rasor.5 7 The Ortega court held that the federal
act was not invalid because:
The power of the Congress of the United States to pro-
mulgate laws for the betterment of the public health, morals,
safety, and welfare is beyond question."t
The court took notice that the petitioner had voluntarily initiated
the proceedings for his civil commitment.59 The petitioner also knew
exactly what he was doing as evidenced by the transcript at his
hearing as well as by the transcript of voluntary commitment. 60 In
view of the evidence, the court held that the petitioner was not de-
prived of his liberty even though he had committed no crime.61 The
Ortega court is in complete agreement with the decision reached in
Felber, that when protecting the public welfare is involved, the en-
actment of police power statutes is a proper exercise of governmental
authority.6 2
52 Id.
53 Pub. L. 91-513, 84- Stat. 1236, Amending Pub. L. 89-793, 80 Stat. 1438 (1966). The
purpose of the amendment is to provide increased research into and prevention of
drug abuse and drug dependence, to provide for treatment and rehabilitation of
drug abusers and drug dependent persons, and to strengthen existing law enforcement




57 291 F. Supp. 748 (S. D. Fla. 1968), But cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (decision involved the constitutionality of a state statute calling for the
imprisonment of narcotic addicts who have not committed any crimes).
5 Id. at 750.
59 Id. at 751.
60 id. at 752.
61 Id.
6' Id. at 751.
Sept. 1972
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The constitutionality of the NARA was also upheld in the recent
case of United States v. Turner.63 In this case the defendant, who was
a drug addict, petitioned the court to be admitted for treatment
under Title I of NARA. 64 The court held that the defendant was not
eligible for treatment because he had been convicted of a crime of
violence.65 This exclusion was provided by Congress in the NARA.
66
It was stated in the facts that the defendant was convicted in 1970
as an adult for petit larceny, and in 1971 for a violation of the Uniform
Narcotics Act. The defendant stated that his exclusion from Title I
of the NARA was unconstitutional in that the provisions of the
NARA arbitrarily excludes from treatment those persons charged
with or convicted of crimes of violence. The court noted, however,
that even though there are no facilities in the District of Columbia
for addicts such as the defendant, there are federal facilities such
as the NARA Rehabilitation Center at Lexington, Kentucky, avail-
able for individuals with problems similar to the defendant's. 67 Since
treatment is afforded to individuals similar to the defendant, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of Title I of the NARA on its
fact and as applied. 68
President Nixon, realizing the spread of drug abuse throughout
our nation, formed the Ad Hoc Committee on Drug Abuse in 1969.69
One purpose of this committee was to start a dialogue for the pre-
vention and control of drug abuse.70 After discussing many types of
drug abuse programs, Congress finally amended the Public Health
Service Act and other laws to bring the problem of drug abuse under
one law known as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970.71 The purpose of this act, as set forth in its pre-
amble is:
... to provide for treatment and rehabilitation of drug
abusers and drug-dependent persons; and to strengthen ex-
isting law enforcement authority in the field of drug abuse.72
The new law not only tries to control the legal channels of abused
drugs such as the physician and pharmacist, 73 but also the manufac-
turer and the distributor of controlled substances.7 4 Some authorities
feel that the physician and pharmacist have been the subject of far
6 337 F. Supp. 1045 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1972).
64 28 U. S. C. §§ 2901 et seq. (1970).
65 United States v. Turner, 337 F. Supp. 1045, at 1043-49 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1972).
66 18 U. S. C. § 4251 (f) (i); 28 U. S. C. § 2901 (g) (i).
67 United States v. Turner, 337 F. Supp. 1045, at 1047-48 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1972).
68 Id. at 104-8, 1049. The District Court relied heavily on Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966) and the more recent case of United States v. Leazer, - F.2d -
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1972) where the Leazer court stated that Title I of the NARA
was based on the "legitimate goal of deterrence" and that such policy was proper.
69 S. Yolles, The Drug Phenomenon, NS10 J. AM. PHARM. Ass'N 403, at 407 (July 1970).
70 Id.
71 Pub. L. 19-513, 84 Stat, 1242, 21 U. S. C. A. 801 (1970).
72 Id. at Preamble.
73 Id. at Title II Part C § 302.
74 Id.
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too many controls and that this recent act will add one more law to
an already over-flowing barrel. 75 Others feel, however, that the med-
ical professions have not done enough in the field of drug abuse.76
It must be remembered that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act not
only provides for control but provisions are also made for education
and rehabilitative programs 77 and assisting states in their own drug
abuse programs. 8
With the enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, the
country seems to be moving in the right direction. The rehabilitation
and education programs will be administered by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare79 while the control of drugs of abuse
will be administered by the Attorney General.80
Case Study-The New York Statute and Paul James
In 1966, the Legislature of the State of New York, under the
guidance of Governor Nelson Rockefeller,8 ' passed what is now known
as sections 200-217 of the Mental Hygiene Law. This law dealt with
the comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts. The
constitutionality of this new law was upheld by the Supreme Court
of New York, Bronx County, in it re Spadafora.8 2 Mr. Justice Walte-
made, speaking for the court, held that compulsory rehabilitation is
valid.8 3 This law popularly known as the Narcotic Addiction Control
Law, provided that the certification of persons who are allegedly
drug addicts for treatment and admittance to an appropriate insti-
tution.84
The Mental Hygiene Law provides for aftercare and supervision
of drug addicts who have completed a prescribed course of inpatient
treatment where the Narcotics Addiction Control Commission
(NACC) believed that the drug addict would benefit from such a
program.8 5 The Commission had the power to return any drug addict
from aftercare to inpatient treatment.86 Admission or certification of
a drug addict to an institution did not forfeit or abridge any of the
rights of such person, as a citizen of the United States or of the State
of New York, including the right to register or vote.8 7 The facts or
75 G. Scharringhausen, Pharmacy and the Pharmacist, DRuG Topics 17 (May 24, 1971).
76 H. Davidson, Drug Abuse Epidemics: Why? PHARMACY TIMES 14 (Nov. 1970) (Dr.
Davidson was editor of the Journal of the Medical Society of New Jersey at the
time the editorial was written).
77 Pub. L. 91-513, Title I Part D § 256, 82 Stat. 1009, (1970).
78 Pub. L. 88-164, 77 Stat. 291 (1963), Amending Pub. L. 90-31, 81 Stat. 79 (1967).
79 Pub. L. 91-513, Title I Part E § c4 (1970).
80 Pub. L. 91-513, Title II Part B § 201 (1970).
81 In re Spadafora, 54 Misc. 2d 123, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 923 at 927 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
s2 54 Misc. 2d. 123, 281 N.Y. 2d 923 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
83 Id.
84 N.Y. PUBLC HEALTH LAW, §§ 3300 et seq. (McKinney 1966).
85 N.Y. MENTAL HyGiENE LAW, §§ 210, 212 (McKinney 1966).
86 Id.
87 id. at 9 206-b.
21 CLE VF ST. L. R. (3), Sept. 1972188
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proceedings relating to the admission, certification or treatment of
any such drug addict could not be used against him or without his
consent in any court proceeding.88 A drug addict, upon voluntary
application, may be admitted to any state hospital or facility having
special facilities for the treatment of such addiction. In such cases
he may be retained for an indefinite period not exceeding thirty-six
months at the discretion of the court.8 9
The procedures of the above act were still to be tested. This test
came in the spring of 1967, just several months after the law took
effect.90 On May 2, 1967, a justice of the Supreme Court of New York
County issued a warrant for the apprehension and detention of Paul
James, pursuant to section 206, subd. 2 (a) of the Mental Hygiene Law.
This warrant was issued upon the petition of Anna James (mother
of the alleged addict) who declared that her petition was based upon
reasonable grounds that her son was an addict.91 It was this petition
and subsequent events leading to Paul James' commitment which
created much confusion as to the constitutionality of the new law.
Also on May 2, 1967, Paul James was brought to the Edgecombe
Reception Center, a New York State narcotic addiction control facil-
ity. On May 3, James was examined by a physician who stated that
in his opinion, from the history obtained from the alleged addict and
from James' physical examination, he should be certified by the
court as a narcotic addict as defined in section 201 of the Mental
Hygiene Law. 92 On May 15, 1967, Paul James, after several hearings
with counsel, was certified an addict to the care and custody of the
NACC pursuant to section 206 subd. 4(c) of the Mental Hygiene
Law.98 Paul James exercised his right to have a jury trial pursuant
to section 206.7. On July 31, 1967, the jury rendered a verdict of "Yes"
to the question-"Was Paul James a narcotic addict at the time of
the medical examination on May 3, 1967"?94 Judge Spiegel stated
in In re James9H that the burden of proof is on the state to prove that
such person is in fact an addict,9 6 and that only a preponderance of
evidence is needed for jury to rule for commitment as in any
civil case. 97 On the appeal to the same court, James alleged that the
statute was unconstitutional. 98 The defense stated that the statute
violated the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
88 Id.
89 Id. at § 206.
90 In re James, 54 Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd 22 N.Y. 2d
545, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1968).




95 In re James, 54 Misc. 2d 300, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 408 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
96 Id., 282 N.Y.S. 2d at 410.
97 Id. at 412.
18 In re James, 54 Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd 22 N.Y. 2d
545, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1968).
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Paul James was first examined by a physician at the Edgecombe
Reception Center. During this examination, he admitted that he used
heroin and that he had been addicted to drugs. The physician had the
statutory right to conduct the examination."0 However, no direction
is contained in this Article for the doctor to advise the addict that
anything said may be held against him.100 These admissions were used
by the physician at James' jury trial. Speaking for the court, Judge
Spiegel stated that this practice was a violation of requirements
stated by the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda v.
State of Arizona.1 1 According to the holding in Miranda, the prosecu-
tion may not use statements from custodial interrogation unless pro-
cedural safeguards against self-incrimination are used.10 2 The James
Court stated that from the issuance of the warrant up to the appeal,
Paul James had been under complete control and authority of the
NACC, including detention in an addiction hospital. 0 3 This entire
procedure violated the provisions of Miranda even though Paul James
was not accused of a crime.104 It is well settled law that addiction to
drugs is not a crime.10 5 Judge Spiegel stated that the basic provisions
of the new law are sound . .. but the adequate safeguards of due
process are not to be forgotten. 0 6 Concluding, the James Court held
that the procedure for apprehension and detention of James was a
violation of Amendments Five, Six and Fourteen of the U. S. Con-
stitution.107
On appeal, however, brought by the Narcotics Addiction Control
Commission, the James decision was reversed. 08 The Appellate Court
with one Justice dissenting and one Justice concurring in result,
held that the statements of James to the physician did not prejudice
his rights because a medical examination would have been ordered
by the court anyway and counsel was provided after the examina-
tion.10 9 The Narcotics Addiction Control Act also should not fail since
there are safeguards such as trial before court and jury.110
In his concurring opinion Justice Capozzoli very aptly stated:
It must be remembered that the purpose of the statute
under consideration is not to punish those who come within
0 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, § 206 subd. 3 (1966).
109 In re James, 54. Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 126, at 132 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd 22
N.Y. 2d 54-5, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1968).
101 384- U.S. 436 (1966).
102 In re James, 54- Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 126, at 137 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd 22
N.Y. 2d 545, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1968).
108 Id., 283 N.Y.S. 2d at 149.
101 Id. at 150.
105 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
106 In re James, 54 Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 126, at 150 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'd 22
N.Y. 2d 545, 24-0 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1968).
3- Id., 283 N.Y.S. 2d at 151.
108 In re Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, 29 App. Div. 2d 72, 285, N.Y.S. 2d 793
(Sup. Ct., Appellate Div., 1967), revd 22 N.Y. 2d 5+5, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S.
2d 531 (1968).
20 Id., 285 N.Y.S. 2d at 799.
110 Id. at 800.
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its terms as narcotic addicts, but, rather, to concentrate on
curing them.'11
And quoting from Chapman v. California,112 Justice Capozzoli con-
tinued:
... We conclude that there may be some constitutional
errors which in the settling of a particular case are so un-
important and insignificant that they may, consistent with
the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring
the automatic reversal of the conviction.'ia
James then moved for the Court of Appeal to stay his commitment
which was granted.114 The motion trying to vacate the stay by the
NACC was denied 1 5 setting the stage for the final appeal of Paul
James' commitment.
Judge Kenneth Keating, speaking for the majority of the court in
Narcotic Addiction Control Commission v. James 16 agreed with the
holding of the Supreme Court, Trial Term, N. Y. County 117 and
stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides that no person shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. The detention of this
appellant, who was charged with no crime, against his will
for a period of three days, without notice of the nature of
the proceeding and an opportunity to contest the finding upon
which the determination to restrain his liberty was pred-
icated, is contrary to our most fundamental notions of fair-
ness and constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law.118
and
... the state may compel an individual to submit to re-
habilitative confinement. We hold, however, that provisions
of section 206 of the Mental Hygiene Law as they affect the
proceedings leading up to confinement are unconstitutional,
... which requires a reversal here."19
The court noted that the particular provisions in the act in question
have been amended and obviated as to future cases.
120
1"1 Id. at 801.
112 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
113 In re Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, 29 App. Div. 2d 72, 285 N.Y.S. 2d 793
(Sup. Ct., Appellate Div., 1967), rwd 22 N.Y. 2d 545, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S.
2d 531 (1968).
114 In re Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, 21 N.Y. 2d 862, 236, N.E. 2d 166, 288
N.Y.S. 2d 1013 (1968).
115 In re Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, 22 N.Y. 2d 877, 239 N.E. 2d 920, 293
N.Y.S. 2d 336 (1968).
116 In re Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, 22 N.Y. 2d 545, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293
N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1968).
117 In re James, 54 Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1967) re'd 22 N.Y. 2d
545, 240 N.E. 2d 29, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1968).
1s Id., 22 N.Y. 2d at 552.
119 Id. at 553, 554.
120 N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 206 (L. 1968, ch. 772).
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In the James decision, the addict had not committed a crime. In
subsequent New York cases the section of the Mental Hygiene Law
dealing with addicts who have committed crimes 121 were also held un-
constitional 2 2 and the statute was later amended to conform to
various due process amendments of the Constitution. 23 It should be
noted that one addict released pursuant to the James decision returned
to the court three months later and repetitioned for his own admis-
sion, saying that he needed the assistance of the program. 2 4
California and Its Different Result
The California Narcotics Law,2 5 which was the model for the
New York law was designed by the legislature to rehabilitate the
addict, not just effectuate a temporary cure. 20 However, the rulings
of the California courts on the constitutionality of the statutes have
been opposite those of the New York courts. In the California cases
with factual situations similar to James, the courts have held that the
requirements stated in Miranda do not apply.12 7 The reasons given
were stated by Associate Justice Kingsley in People v. Garcia1 28 when
he said:
. . . the Escobedo-Dorado-Miranda rules do not apply to
interrogation by a physician conducted solely as a part of
a statutorily required medical examination designed to de-
termine medical facts as a basis for a treatment program
... here the examination was not by an agent of the police
and was of a nature that, usually, cannot be intelligently
conducted without some interrogation of the examinee on
matters that are likely to be "incriminating." The evils dis-
cussed. .. in Miranda do not exist in connection with such an
examination.' 29
In the recent California case of People v. Candelaria"30 Presiding
Justice Files, agreeing in part with the appellate decision of James,
stated for the court:
121 Id., §§ 206 subd. 4, para. a; 208 subd. 2 (1966).
122 People v. Fuller, 57 Misc. 2d 350, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 503 (Sup. Ct., Appellate Div. 1968),
reed 24 N.Y. 2d 292, 24-8 N.E. 2d 17, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 102 (1969) People v. Donaldson,
25 N.Y. 2d 30, 250 N.E. 46, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 549 (1969) (this decision gave Fuller
retroactive application); People v. Gilmore, 37 App. Div. 2d 912, 325 N.Y.S. 2d 455
(Sup. Ct., App. Div., Oct. 28, 1971).
12 N.Y. MENTAL HYGiENE LAW § 206 subd. 4, para. a (amended April 24, 1970)
§208 subd. 2 (amended May 22, 1969); see People v. Roston, 37 App. Div. 2d 624,
323 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (Sup. Ct., Appellate Div. June 23, 1971) where defendant was
entitled to be accorded the procedures provided in § 208.
224 McDonald, supra note 11, at 18.
125 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 11390 el seq. West 1960) ; CAL. WELFARE ANO
INST. CODE §§ 3100 et seq. (Deering 1970).
126 In re Trummer, 60 Cal. 2d 658, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177 (1964) ; People v.
Myers, - Cal. 3d -, 100 Cal. Rptr. 612, at 616, 494. P. 2d 684 (1972).
127 People v. Garcia, 268 Cal. App. .2d 712, 74 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1969).
'28 26S Cal. App. 2d 712, 74 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1969).
220 Id., at 74 Cal. Rptr. 106. See also, People v. Clark, 272 Cal. App. 2d 294, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 50 (1969) ; People v. Engols, 275 Cal. App. 2d 307, 79 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1969).
130 18 Cal. App. 3d 754, 96 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1971).
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It was not a violation of appellant's privilege against self-
incrimination, or his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for
the physician to interview appellant in the jail infirmary,
without counsel, as a part of his medical examination. The
warning-and-waiver requirements established in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, and People
v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P. 2d
361 do not apply.1 1
In the above case the alleged addict was stopped in the street by
a peace officer, taken to a jail infirmary, examined by a physician
and certified as an addict. The addict was committed to the Narcotic
Rehabilitation Center pursuant to §3100.6 of the Code.132 A recent
federal district court decision unanimously approved of the California
decisions when District Judge Hauk in Johnson v. Woods'3 3 stated:
Petitioner was advised of his right to counsel imme-
diately after his arrest. The next day he was examined by
the state-retained physician, an expert on narcotic addiction,
who later testified at petitioner's jury proceedings.
California courts have consistently ruled that there is
no right to counsel at this examination. People v. Garcia, 268
Cal.App. 2d 712, 74 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1969); People v. Clark, 272
Cal.App. 2d 294, 297-298, 77 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1969).
We are satisfied that this conclusion is correct considering
both the nature of the examination and the fact that this is
a civil commitment, not a criminal incarceration. 13 4
Conclusion
It would seem that the holdings reached in the California and
New York courts will ultimately have to be decided by the United
States Supreme Court. The respective interpretations of Miranda and
the Constitutional Amendments are too opposite to permit both hold-
ings to stand concurrently. Even though the alleged addicts are given
a civil rather than a criminal trial they should still have the due
process provisions afforded to criminals. I cannot see how the Calif-
ornia courts can hold that civil commitment differs from criminal
incarceration. Whether a facility is called a rehabilitation center or
a health center it is still a prison.' 3 5
It must be remembered that commitment alone is not the final
solution. Early data from federal programs 136 indicate there is a high
readdiction rate. Only through perserverance in the use of private
programs such as Synanon and Daytop can society hope to cure
addicts.
131 Id., IS Cal. App. 3d at 757, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
132 CAL. WELFAPE AND INST. CODE (West 1968).
133 323 F. Supp, 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
114 Id. at 1396.
135 See BLACK'S LAw DicriONARY, 1358 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
136 Farkas, Peterson, and Barr, New Developments in the Federal Bureau of Prisons
Addict Treatment Program, 34 FED. PROB. 52 (Dec. 1970).
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